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States Supreme Court hands down more explicit guidelines. Whether the upcoming Fowler decision will provide these is unlikely, for the North Carolina
statute is mandatory, and the procedure in that statute is quite different from
that of Texas. The Supreme Court must consider the dangers of totally mandatory statutes and those allowing excessive discretion in sentencing. The
question is whether the Court will also consider a middle ground. As Justice
Harlan cautioned, all attempts to identify before-the-fact those crimes for
62
which the death penalty should be given have been doomed to failure.
Kay C. Martinez

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-Sales and Secured
Transacfions-Sellers' Right to Reclaim Has Priority
Over a Perfected Security Interest
In re Samuels & Co.,
510 F. 2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975).
Samuels & Co., a Texas meat packer, had been financed by C.I.T.
Corporation since 1963. To secure its financing, C.I.T. properly perfected
a lien upon Samuels' assets, inventory, and all after-acquired property, including livestock. In 1969, 15 cattle ranchers delivered their cattle to Samuels
and were issued checks in payment. Before the checks could be paid,
C.I.T., believing itself insecure and apparently aware of the outstanding
checks, refused to advance Samuels any further funds. Samuels immediately
filed for bankruptcy and the checks were subsequently dishonored. The beef
was butchered and sold through the normal course of business and the proceeds placed on deposit with the trustee in bankruptcy. Almost one year
later the sellers filed a petition for reclamation. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas reversed a referee's finding that the
sellers had priority over the creditor which had financed the bankrupt meat
packer's purchase of cattle and the sellers appealed. The court of appeals
reversed and remanded.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed and remanded the case back to the court of appeals. 2 HeldReversed. Strict application of the 10 day limitation on the rights of the
62. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197 (1971).
1. In re Samuels & Co., 483 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1973).
2. Mahon v. Stowers, 416 U.S. 100 (1974).
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sellers to reclaim is not required. A bankrupt buyer who pays for goods with
a check which is subsequently dishonored does not acquire sufficient rights
in the goods for a creditor's lien in after-acquired property to attach. 3
Before the Uniform Commercial Code was enacted, the right of replevin
or reclamation was governed by the concept of title. 4 According to pre-Code
law, payment was a condition precedent to the passage of title in cash sales. 5
If the buyer managed to obtain possession without payment, the seller had
the right to replevy the goods. 6
Pre-Code title concepts and jurisdictional disparity disappeared with the
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. 7 Dispatching the title concept
was the first task of the Uniform Commercial Code. 8 In its place the Code
substituted a hierarchy of rights, powers, and immunities. 9 One example is
the right of reclamation. 10
Typically, a dishonored check produces a demand for reclamation. For
example, seller A receives a check from buyer B in payment for goods but
due to B's insolvency the check is dishonored. The Uniform Commercial
Code views the purchase of goods by an insolvent as fraudulent." In order
12
to protect A from such fraud the Code provides a right of reclamation.
There appear to be two forms of reclamation under the Code, one for credit
sales and the other for cash. The credit seller's rights are clear and well defined in section 2.702.'1

Unfortunately, section 2.702 does not deal with the

cash transaction between seller A and buyer B but reclamation in a cash
situation has been vaguely construed from section 2.507.14 If the case of
3. In re Samuels & Co., 510 F.2d 139, 150 (5th Cir. 1975).
4. A. SQUILLANTE & J. FONSECA, 3 WILLISTON ON SALES § 23-2, at 323-24 (4th ed.
1974). The location of title was the common law and the pre-Code standard for settling
a myriad of property disputes. R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOx OF THE LAW OF SALES § 125,
at 373 (1970).
5. Sprague Canning Mach. Co. v. Fuller, 158 F. 588, 591 (5th Cir. 1908).
6. Harkness v. Russell, 118 U.S. 663, 668 (1886); Harbert v. Fort Smith Canning Co. v. Fuller, 5 P.2d 849, 851 (Kan. 1931).
7. The Texas version of the Uniform Commercial Code is enumerated in the Texas
Business & Commerce Code.
8. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (1968). Article II of the Uniform
Commercial Code deals with the sale of goods and the rights and remedies created by
such a sale. Id. §§ 2.101-2.725; Helstad, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code
on Wisconsin Law, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 355, 363.
9. Park County Implement Co. v. Craig, 397 P.2d 800, 803 (Wyo. 1964), quoting
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-401 (1962).
10. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.507, 2.702 (1968).
11. Id. § 2.702, comment 2. This rule developed from pre-Code law. In re
Meiselman, 105 F.2d 995, 998 (2d Cir. 1939).
12. Thx. Bus. & CoMM. CODE ANN. § 2.507 (1968).
13. Id. § 2.702. Section 2.702 deals with transactions based on credit and the right
of reclamation as set out in that section is subject to the following limitations: the buyer
must be insolvent; the right must be exercised within 10 days of the receipt of the goods
by the buyer; and is subject to the rights of a good faith purchaser.
14. Id. § 2.507. "Where payment is due and demanded on delivery to the buyer
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A v. B involved financially solvent parties there would be no problem be-

cause seller A would be entitled to reassert dominion over the goods any time

after the check was dishonored. 1" B, however, is insolvent and section 2.507
does not expressly provide for A's right to reclaim. Comment three to section
2.507 does suggest such a right. 16 Comment three also proposes that the provisions of section 2.702 in regard to a 10 day limitation and to the rights
of a good faith purchaser should apply here as well. Therefore, A may reclaim his goods from the insolvent B but only within 10 days.
If C, a bona fide purchaser, enters the picture, the case of A v. B
becomes more complicated. Under section 2.403 good title can be transferred to a bona fide purchaser by a holder of voidable title. 17 Hypothetically, buyer B did receive voidable title upon purchase. 18 When B's check
is dishonored seller A could void B's title and reclaim the goods. 19 This
power to void title is lost, however, once the goods are transferred to a bona
fide purchaser. 20 Even if A attempts to reclaim within the 10 day limitation, his efforts are futile against the superior -title of a bona fide purchaser. 2'
Once B obtains an interest in the goods he can use them as collateral for
an article IX security interest. 22 B can obtain a loan from C, a secured party,
of goods or documents of title, his right as against the seller to retain or dispose of
them is conditional upon his making the payment due." Id. § 2.507. This rule developed from pre-Code law. Neal v. Boggan, 11 So. 809, 810 (Ala. 1892); French V.
Lewis, 67 A. 45, 46 (Pa. 1907).
15. J. Wmra & R. SUMMERS, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 98 (1972); Kinyon, Outline of Buyer-Seller Rights and Remedies in Default and Breach Situations Under the U.C.C., 53 MINN. L.R. 729, 731 (1969).
16. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.507, comment 3 (1968) provides:
Subsection (2) deals with the effect of a conditional delivery by the seller and in
such a situation makes the buyer's right as against the seller conditional upon payment. These words are used as words of limitation to conform with the policy set
forth in the bona fide purchaser sections of this Article. Should the seller after
making such a conditional delivery fail to follow up his rights, the condition is
waived. The provision of this Article for a ten day limit within which the seller
may reclaim goods delivered on credit to an insolvent buyer is also applicable here.
17. TFx. Bus. &COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.403(1) (1968) provides:
A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase
the purchaser has such power even though . . . (2) the delivery was in exchange
for a check which is later dishonored, or (3) it was agreed that the transaction
was to be a 'cash sale'....
18. "Voidable" title is not specifically defined in the Code, therefore the pre-Code
definition remains applicable. Weeks v. Bridgman, 159 U.S. 541, 547 (1895). "Voidable" transactions are those which are valid and effectual until they are avoided by some
act. Rothberg v. Schmiedeskamp, 134 N.E.2d 544, 546 (Mass. 1956). The word "voidable" imports a valid act which may be avoided rather than an invalid act which may
be confirmed.
19. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.507, 2.702 (1968).
20. Id. § 2.403; R. NORDSTROM, HANDOOK OF TIE LAW OF SALES § 170, at 51415 (1970).
21. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.403 (1968); R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF SALES § 170, at 514-15 (1970).
22. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.204
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in exchange for the creation of a security interest in the goods sold by A.
For C to create this security interest, section 9.204 requires that there be attachment. 23 If B defaults on the security agreement and does not initiate
proper repayment then C has several remedies at his disposal: sale of the

26
collateral, 24 retention of the collateral, 25 or an action for the debt.
When separate situations involving article II and article IX occur the Code
resolves the commercial conflicts smoothly. When a problem develops, however, which causes an overlap of the two articles the result is often a quagmire of legal reasoning. For example, suppose B had created a security
agreement in exchange for a loan from C which covered all of B's afteracquired property. Then B obtained property from seller A and paid for
it with a worthless check. A, who has never paid, seeks to reclaim from B who
has become insolvent. C, on the other hand, asserts that his perfected
security interest takes priority over A's right to reclaim and that, additionally,
he is a bona fide purchaser. Determining the rights and remedies in this
situation is no easy task.
In re Samuels & Co., 27 represents exactly the same situation as this
hypothetical. C.I.T. was the secured party that held an after-acquired security interest in Samuels' property. The dispute is between C.I.T. 'nd several unpaid cattle ranchers who sold cattle to Samuels in exchange for a dishonored check. In order to enable the ranchers to recover, the court in
Samuels was forced to create some unprecedented rulings.
The first and most notable finding in Samuels was the extension of the
10 day limit on reclamation to almost a full year. 28 Rationalization of this
extension was achieved with three points of analysis. The first point was that

Commercial Code deals with secured transactions, the sale of accounts, and the sale of
chattel paper. Id. §§ 9.101-9.507.
23. Id. § 9.204. Attachment of a security interest takes place when (1) there is
an agreement that the security interest attach to the collateral, (2) the secured party
has given value, and (3) the debtor has obtained sufficient rights in the collateral. Id.
§ 9.204. The agreement to create the security interest can be made long before B ever
acquires the goods from A. Tax. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(44) (1968) provides that "[a] person gives 'value' for rights if he acquires them . . . (b) as security
for or in total or partial satisfaction of a pre-existing claim .... " "Sufficient rights
in the collateral" for attachment is not tested by any concept of title but is determined
by the weighing of various ownership rights; primary among them is possession. James
Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 194 N.W.2d 775, 780-81 (Minn. 1972). In First
Nat'l Bank v. Smoker, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 10, 19 (Ind. App. 1972) it was stated that:
[W]hen a debtor acquires possession of collateral under a contract, he has acquired
such rights in the collateral as to allow the security interest of his creditor to attach
to the collateral, and this is true regardless of who may be deemed to have title
to and ownership of such collateral.
24. Tax. Bus. & COMM. CoDE ANN. § 9.504 (1968).
25. Id. § 9.505(b).
26. Id. § 9.501(a).
27. 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975).
28. Id. at 148.
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the purpose of the 10 day rule is to place creditors on notice of the seller's
claim so that they, the other creditors, might not prejudice themselves. 29
Otherwise, a creditor might extend credit to the insolvent, subsequent to its
filing a petition in bankruptcy, on the basis of a misapprehension that
the insolvent possesses unencumbered assets. Here, because C.I.T. had an
intimate knowledge of Samuels' financial affairs, the court reached the decision that C.I.T. was not prejudiced in any way by the sellers' non-compliance
with the 10 day rule.30 The second point was that since the sellers made
a good faith effort to comply with the statute, it was deduced that they should
be forgiven for their oversight. 3' Finally, it was asserted that the sellers
really had nothing to reclaim because the butchered cattle lost their identity.
Accordingly, a strict application of the 10 day requirement was held
32
unnecessary.
Close examination of the court's decision reveals that it is based on faulty
analyses. The dissenting opinion questioned the first point-the purpose of
the 10 day requirement-asserting that notification to third party purchasers
is unnecessary for the rights appear to be protected even if the seller complies
with the 10 day limit.33 That is, a secured party can qualify as a bona fide
purchaser and defeat the seller's reclamation rights. Thus, the purpose of
the 10 day limit must be more than mere notice to third parties. The court's
discussion of the good faith efforts of the sellers to comply with the 10 day
statute is irrelevant. Simply because the sellers were unaware of the require34
ments of the Code does not excuse them from following it.
The final point of analysis was that the sellers had nothing to reclaim, that
is, their cattle were butchered beef incapable of being identified.3 5 There
appears to be little reason why the sellers could not have reclaimed this butchered beef. True, the livestock no longer existed but the processed beef
certainly did exist. The court eventually allowed the sellers to reclaim the
cash proceeds received from the sale of this beef. Therefore, if the cash pro29. Id. at 147.
30. Id. at 147-48, 152. C.I.T. had been financing Samuels for six years. The
amount of cash advances made to Samuels was calculated each week after C.I.T. examined the outstanding accounts and the current inventory. From this continuous study
of the slaughtering business it was determined that C.I.T. must have been intricately
aware of the financial status of Samuels. Id. at 147-48, 152. C.I.T. had filed its own
petition for reclamation two weeks after the petition for bankruptcy was filed and a
hearing was held where there was extensive disclosure of Samuels' financial affairs.
While all the outside claims were not particularized, the hearing disclosed many claims
against the estate and demonstrated to the parties involved the great likelihood of other
claims. Id. at 147.
31. Id. at 148.
32. Id. at 148.
33. Id. at 157 (dissenting opinion).
34. To quote Judge Godbold's dissent, "Mistake of law does not constitute excuse
of mistake." Id. at 157 (dissenting opinion).
35. Id. at 148.
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ceeds were traceable then the butchered beef must also have been capable
of identification.
The decision to extend the 10 day requirement when third party creditors
have been notified is an extraordinary development. The entire concept of
reclamation for cash sales is actually judicially created. The Code fails to
provide a specific provision covering it, referring to reclamation only in comment three to 2.507 .36 The task of sorting the law from the scant clues supplied by the Code devolves upon the judiciary.
It has been suggested that a strict compliance with a 10 day limitation
37
is not necessary and that a "reasonable efforts" test should be used instead.
Strict compliance with the 10 day rule allows too much room for inequity.
In situations where it takes more than 10 days for a bank to return a check
for insufficient funds the injustice of the 10 day rule is manifest. Nonetheless, case law has usually demanded strict adherence to the 10 day limitation. 38 In fact, there are very few cases which have not applied the 10 day
39
limit to a 2.507 reclamation.
After determining that the sellers fulfilled the requirements for reclamation, Judge Ingraham, speaking for the majority, addressed himself to C.I.T.'s
contention that any attempt by the sellers to retain title in the goods merely
reserved an unperfected security interest and this unperfected interest was
subordinate to the perfected security interest C.I.T. held in Samuels' afteracquired property. 40 In order to find for the cattle ranchers, the court had
to determine that the ranchers' interest was something other than an unperfected purchase money security interest. Otherwise C.I.T.'s perfected security interest would take priority over the sellers' reclamation rights or un41
perfected security interest.
36. 2 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORm COMMERCIAL CODE § 2.507:8, 2.507:13 (2d ed.
1971).
37. R. NORnsTRoM, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 166, at 503 (1970).
38. In re Mort, 208 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1962) is a leading case where goods
delivered by the seller were paid for by check. The check was dishonored and the seller
was allowed to reclaim the proceeds derived from the sale of the goods. The seller,
however, reclaimed from the trustee in bankruptcy within ten days. Id. at 310. In re
Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1968) involved a dispute where the
ten day limitation was' not observed by the seller when an insolvent buyer paid for logs
with a worthless check. The court specifically held that after ten days the right of reclamation is waived. Id. at 846. This appears to be the majority rule. In re Colacci's
of America, Inc., 490 F.2d 1118, 1121 (10th Cir. 1974); Stumbo v. Paul B. Hult Lumber
Co., 444 P.2d 564, 571 (Ore. 1968).
39. In re Lindenbaum's Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. 495, 497 (E.D. Pa. 1964). Employing
a rather novel approach, the court used the § 3.503(2) definition for a reasonable time
allowed for presentment of a check. The seller was given 30 days to reclaim. Id. at
497.
40. In re Samuels & Co., 510 F.2d 139, 148-49 (5th Cir. 1975).
41. The seller's right to reclamation is inferior to a perfected security interest in
goods subject to an after acquired property clause. Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado
Springs Nat'l Bank, 519 F.2d 354, 359 (Colo. 1974). See generally Hogan, The Mar-
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C.I.T.'s contention was based on 2.401(a) which states: "Any retention
or reservation by the seller of the title [property] in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest. '4 2
The court rejected this contention and held that 2.401(a) dealt solely with
credit. 43 Otherwise the cash seller would be forced to comply with article IX
security provisions. Such compliance was thought to be unreasonable as the
time neded to fulfill article IX filing and perfection procedures is far greater
44
than the time required to cash a check.
The court, in finding that 2.401(a) is inapplicable to cash transactions, appears to be in conflict with the weight of authority. The language of
2.401 states, "any retention by the seller." The word "any" does not imply
that the statute is not applicable to cash sales. 45 Further substantiation
comes from article I which states: "The retention or reservation of title by
a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer (section
2.401) is limited in effect to a reservation of a 'security interest.' 46 Cases
have consistently applied 2.401(a) to cash sales. 47 Judge Godbold in his
dissenting opinion states that there are no cases suggesting that 2.401 applies only to credit sales. 4" If the majority is correct, section 2.401 would
merely be definitional, for a credit sale is but a sales transaction in which
the seller reserves a security interest.
The next proposition presented by the court to enable the cattle ranchers
to prevail was the suggestion that C.I.T.'s security interest might never have
attached and, thus, C.I.T. had no interest at all in the beef.49 This contention is based on the 9.203 requirements for enforceability of a security agreeriage of Sales to Chattel Security in the Uniform Commercial Code: Massachusetts Variety, 38 B.U.L. REv. 571, 580 (1958); Note, Selected Priority Problems in Securing
Financing Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 YALE L.J. 751, 758 (1959).
42. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.401(a) (1968).
43. In re Samuels & Co., 510 F.2d 139, 149 (6th Cir. 1975).

44. In an inventory situation, to assure priority, a purchase money security interest
must be perfected when the buyer takes possession and all other secured parties must
be notified. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 9.312(c)(1), (2) (1968); Hogan, Unperfected Security Interests and the "Floating Lien," 44 TEXAs L. REV. 713, 720-21
(1966).
45. One argument in the court's favor could center on the introductory words to
2.401. "Insofar as situations are not covered by the other provisions of this chapter
and matters concerning title become material the following rules apply .... ." It could
be argued that 2.507 covers situations where the seller reserves title other than a security
interest. Thus, the subsequent sentence in 2.401, limiting reservation of title to a security interest, would become inapplicable to 2.507.
46. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(37) (1968).
47. E.g., English v. Ford, 95 Cal. Rptr. 501, 506 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 519 P.2d 354, 359 (Colo. 1974); First
Nat'l Bank v. Smoker, 11 U.C.C. Rep. 10, 20-22 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972); Evans Prods.
v. Jorgensen, 421 P.2d 978, 981 (Ore. 1966).
48. In re Samuels & Co., 510 F.2d 139, 158 (5th Cir. 1975) (dissenting opinion).
49. Id. at 150.
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ment. 50 One such requirement is that the debtor possess rights in the collateral before any security interest can attach. 51 The court's discussion of
this point is not very convincing. The opinion states that less than absolute
ownership has been deemed a sufficient right in the property to which a lien
in after-acquired property can attach.52 It also admitted that Samuels had
possession of the cattle and had -the right ,toslaughter and butcher. This indicates sufficient rights existed in the collateral for attachment of the C.I.T.
security interest.
The final justification for granting the cattle ranchers reclamation is that
since the Code provides that the rights of the creditor stem from the debtor
obtaining rights in the collateral, then the creditor's rights are derived from
and are no greater than those of the debtor.58 Purportedly, when Samuels
failed to pay, the contractual relationship came to an end. Samuels and
C.I.T. then had no right to dispose of the merchandise. This holding runs
in direct opposition to C.I.T.'s contention that it was a good faith purchaser.5 4
If C.I.T. were a good faith purchaser it could have obtained good title from
a defaulting cash buyer.5 5 C.I.T.'s interest would have remained after
Samuels' rights had vanished with its dishonored check. To qualify as a good
faith purchaser, C.I.T. must first be a purchaser under the Code. The Code
states: " 'Purchase' includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage,
pledge, lien, issue or re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating
57
an interest in property." 56 A purchaser is anyone who takes by purchase.
This definition is broad enough to include a secured party.58 Since a secured
party acquires his interest by contract,5 9 and a contract is a voluntary transaction under 1.201(32)," 0 then a secured party is a purchaser within the
Code.
50. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.203, 9.204 (1968).
51. Id. § 9.203, 9.204.
52. In re Samuels & Co., 510 F.2d 139, 150 (5th Cir. 1975).
53. J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-4, at 795
(1972).
54. In re Samuels & Co., 510 F.2d 139, 144 (5th Cir. 1975).
55. Physical delivery of goods to transferor-purchaser by the true owner sufficiently
empowers that transferor-purchaser to transfer good title to a good faith purchaser even
though delivery was in exchange for a check which was later dishonored. E.g., Marshall
v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 175 S.E.2d 84, 85 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970); Lane v.
Honeycutt, 188 S.E.2d 604, 605 (N.C. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 190 S.E.2d 466 (N.C.
1972); Sandlin v. First Nat'l Bank, 253 N.E.2d 313, 315 (Ohio Ct. App. 1969); Hudiburg Chevrolet, Inc. v. Ponce, 116 N.W.2d 252, 255-56 (Wis. 1962); A. SQUILLANTE

& J.

FONESCA,

56.
57.
58.
(Colo.

3

WILLISTON ON SALES

§ 23-13, at 370 (4th ed. 1974).

TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(32) (1968).
Id. § 1.201(33).
Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 519 P.2d 354, 358
1974). "In our view, the definition of 'purchase' and 'purchaser,' as set forth

in the Colorado Uniform Commercial Code, are sufficiently broad to encompass a
lender who takes a security interest in goods as security for its loan." Id. at 358.
59. TEx. Bus. & CoMM. CODE ANN. § 9.102(b) (1968).
60. R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES §§ 168, 169 at 509 (1970).
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The second major requirement for bona fide purchaser status is good faith.
Honesty in fact is the generalized definition of good faith which pertains to
the whole Code. 61 In addition to this minimum standard of good faith article
II has an even more specialized requirement. Article II requires observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. 62 The court in Samuels
maintained that C.I.T. did not act in good faith by reasoning that had an intimate knowledge of Samuels' affairs and must have known that outstanding
checks would be dishonored when credit to Samuels was stopped. 63 The
bad faith finding rests on the issue of whether knowledge of outstanding
claims destroys good faith. While the common law bona fide purchaser and
several provisions of the Code require lack of knowledge of outside claims, 64
article II's definition does not expressly or impliedly contain lack of knowledge of third part claims as an element.",
The majority cites two cases for the proposition that notice of outstanding claims destroys good faith. The case of Fidelity & Casualty Co. v.
Key Biscayne Bank66 concerns stock certificates under an article VIII good
faith definition, not an article II definition. The Greater Louisville Auto
Auction v. Ogle Buick Inc. 67 case does not deal with a purchaser but an agent
of the buyer, therefore bona fide purchaser status is immediately ruled out.
Furthermore, the court in GreaterLouisville found a conscious design on the
part of the agent to deceive the buyer into going through with the sale and
then withholding the proceeds. In Samuels there was no such finding of a
conscious design. In this regard, it appears that the court's authority does
not support its finding.
It is apparent that Samuels is an example of a court bending the law to
fit a fact situation to do what is "fair." In so doing Samuels has arrived at
some startling conclusions. It is extremely doubtful that the court's ruling
on the inapplicability of 2.401 to cash sales will gather many disciples. Likewise, the holding that article II good faith requires lack of knowledge of third
party claims will probably not receive much acceptance. The 10 day limitation, however, is another matter. Due to the possible inequities that can arise
from a strict adherence to this limitation, it would seem probable that future
The voluntary requirement in the definition of a purchaser explains why a lien creditor
or a trustee in bankruptcy could not prevail over the seller as they cannot be good

faith purchasers. Liens are not voluntary transactions. They are applied by the creditor
or the trustee in bankruptcy without the debtor's consent. Id. § 168 at 509.
61. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CoDE ANN. § 1.201(19), § 1.201, comment 19 (1968).
62. Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 281 N.Y.S.2d 400, 404 (Civ. Ct. 1967);
TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.103(a)(2) (1968).
63. In re Samuels &Co., 510 F.2d 139, 151 (5th Cir. 1975).
64. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.302, 6.110, 8.301, 8.302, 9.301(a)(2)
(1968).

65. Id. § 2.103(a)(2).
66. 501 F.2d 1322, 1326 (5th Cir. 1974).
67. 387 S.W.2d 17, 21 (Ky.1965).
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decisions will follow the equitable trend initiated by Samuels. By finding
that the sellers maintained the right to reclaim after approximately one year,
the concept of a strict 10 day waiver has certainly been weakened. Whether
this will endure after subsequent decisions remains to be seen.
James M. Smith
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